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Grasping actions and social
interaction: neural bases and
anatomical circuitry in the monkey
Stefano Rozzi* and Gino Coudé
Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma, Parma, Italy
The study of the neural mechanisms underlying grasping actions showed that cognitive
functions are deeply embedded in motor organization. In the first part of this review, we
describe the anatomical structure of the motor cortex in the monkey and the cortical
and sub-cortical connections of the different motor areas. In the second part, we review
the neurophysiological literature showing that motor neurons are not only involved in
movement execution, but also in the transformation of object physical features into motor
programs appropriate to grasp them (through visuo-motor transformations). We also
discuss evidence indicating that motor neurons can encode the goal of motor acts and
the intention behind action execution. Then, we describe one of the mechanisms—the
mirror mechanism—considered to be at the basis of action understanding and intention
reading, and describe the anatomo-functional pathways through which information about
the social context can reach the areas containing mirror neurons. Finally, we briefly
show that a clear similarity exists between monkey and human in the organization of
the motor and mirror systems. Based on monkey and human literature, we conclude
that the mirror mechanism relies on a more extended network than previously thought,
and possibly subserves basic social functions. We propose that this mechanism is also
involved in preparing appropriate complementary response to observed actions, allowing
two individuals to become attuned and cooperate in joint actions.
Keywords: motor, mirror neurons, intention, motor goal, grasping, parietal
Introduction
Over the last 50 years, sensorimotor neuroscience has produced an extensive body of work dedicated
to the study of grasping. The motor act of grasping is multifaceted and lies at the crossroad between
action and perception. Here, a distinction should be drawn between the grasping motor act and
the action of grasping. A grasping motor act can be defined as a series of joint movements, like
clasping the fingers on an object, aimed at achieving the motor goal of seizing. An action of grasping
consists in a sequence of fluently linked motor acts that altogether are aiming at the achievement of
an overarching behavioral goal. For instance, a grasping action would consist in reaching, grasping a
fruit and bringing it to the mouth for eating. Under normal circumstances, a grasping motor act
is executed within a sequence of other motor acts together forming a grasping action. Such an
action can be driven by a wide gamut of needs and aimed at a variety of overarching goals such
as feeding, exploring the environment, or interacting with other individuals. Interestingly, socially
appropriate behaviors require a continuous monitoring of the social environment. Accordingly,
numerous studies both on monkey and human focused on analyzing the motor behavior, especially
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grasping actions, to investigate basic social interactions.
Altogether, these studies demonstrate that grasping is modulated
by the social context in which it occurs. This, in turn, implies that
the motor system, that actually produces the behavior itself, is
involved in a larger network encoding social aspects of real life.
However, the neural mechanisms at the basis of this coupling
between social cognition and motor behavior have not yet
been fully unveiled. In this review, we describe the basic neural
mechanisms underpinning grasping and show how these same
mechanisms are also at the bases of cognitive abilities that are
basic aspects of social cognition such as action understanding
and intention reading. This paper mainly focus on the anatomical
and functional literature based on the macaque monkey model.
Indeed, monkeys have been used for brain studies since the
beginning of the twentieth century (Brodmann, 1909; Bucy, 1933,
1935; Fulton, 1935), and we owe to monkey studies a huge part
of our knowledge on the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology
of the motor system. This is especially true for the neural bases
and the anatomical circuitry involved in grasping. Monkeys are
capable of using their hands for grasping in a way that is very
similar to humans. Evolution is opportunistic and conservative:
working mechanisms tend to be retained through generations
and species and novelty tends to be built by adapting extant
material and processes to the new demands. Without denying the
obvious gap existing between the monkey brain and the human
brain (see Iriki and Sakura, 2008; Passingham, 2009), we think
that the macaque model remains invaluable for the anatomo-
physiological study of grasping. Thus, in the first part of the
paper we describe the anatomical structure of the motor cortex
in the monkey and the cortical and sub-cortical connections
of the areas forming it. In the second section, we review the
monkey functional literature showing two important aspects:
(1) that motor neurons are not only involved in movement
execution, but also in the sensory-motor transformation for
grasping, and (2) that a population of these neurons encodes
the goal of grasping motor acts and the motor intention behind
action execution. In the third part, we describe one of the
mechanisms—the mirror mechanism—considered to be at the
basis of action understanding and intention reading. In particular
we discuss how important aspects of the social environment
such as the spatial representation of self, objects and others,
modulate the motor and mirror neurons activity, influencing
monkeys behavioral responses. In the last part, we briefly show
that mechanisms similar to those described in the monkey are
also present in the homo species.
Anatomy of the Motor System
The Motor Cortex: General Organization
At the end of the nineteenth century the general view of the
organization of the motor system was that the movements
were controlled by subcortical centers, while the cerebral cortex
was involved cognitive functions. This view was challenged by
pioneering studies demonstrating that the electrical stimulation
of a specific part of the frontal cortex (motor cortex) evoked body
movements in different species of animals (Fritsch and Hitzig,
1870; Ferrier, 1873; see Porter and Lemon, 1993). The idea that
the motor cortex contains a simple map of the muscles was in
line with Jackson’s observations on the epileptic seizures in human
patients. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Campbell
(1905) identified a possible anatomical substrate accounting for
Jackson’s observations in his architectonic map of the human
cerebral cortex. Campbell’s (1905) view was that the precentral
cortex was implicated in motor control, while the intermediate
sectorwas involved inwhatwill be later called “higher ordermotor
functions.” A similar view emerged fromBrodmann’s (1909) work,
where he confirmed the existence of two motor areas, area 4
and area 6, and provided a more detailed map of the frontal
lobe both in monkeys and humans. The idea that architectonic
differences reflects functional specificity was later supported by
Fulton (1935), who showed that the ablation of area 6 produces
specific deficits in the execution of skilled movements. This
observation led him to refer to this region as premotor cortex.
However, a few years later, Woolsey’s electrophysiological studies
(Woolsey and Settlage, 1952) casted doubts about the existence of
a high order motor area rostral to area 4, and led him to conclude
that area 4 and posterior area 6 form together a functional entity,
while the not electrically excitable rostral area 6 does not belong
of the motor cortex.
Brodmann’s definition of area 6 as a single architectonic entity
was also challenged by subsequent anatomical studies in which
this sectorwas divided in different areas (e.g., Vogt andVogt, 1919;
Von Bonin and Bailey, 1947; Barbas and Pandya, 1987). Recently,
a more objective assessment of areal borders was provided by
combining cytoarchitectonic and neurochemical techniques (see
Geyer et al., 2000; Belmalih et al., 2007). This multiarchitectonic
approach yielded a more refined map of the motor cortex of
the macaque monkey (Figure 1; Matelli et al., 1985, 1991;
Belmalih et al., 2009). In this parcellation, area F1 roughly
corresponds to Brodman’s area 4 (primarymotor cortex), whereas
the mesial, dorsal, and ventral sectors of Brodman’s area 6 are
each divided into caudal and rostral areas. This parcellation has
been further validated by converging functional evidence showing
that each of these architectonic subdivisions are connectionally
and functionally distinct. The resulting map indicates that the
macaque motor cortex is a mosaic of distinct areas and contains a
multiplicity of bodymovement representations, each emphasizing
different categories of behavior andplaying a specific role inmotor
control (see Rizzolatti et al., 1998). Thus, the “mapping from
cortex to muscles is not fixed, as was once thought, but instead
is fluid, changing continuously on the basis of feedback in a
manner that could support the control of higher-order movement
parameters” (Graziano, 2006).
Connections of the Motor Areas of the Monkey
Connectional studies are warranted to gather clues about
their functional role and complete the picture etched through
architectonic studies. Bymeans of tract tracing studies, it has been
shown that each motor area is characterized by a specific pattern
of connections. Based on these general connectivity patterns,
the premotor areas have been grouped into two major classes
(Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001): the caudal (F2, F3, F4, F5p, and
F5c) and the rostral (F5a, F6, and F7) premotor areas. In the
following paragraphs, we describe the descending and cortical
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FIGURE 1 | Lateral and mesial views of the monkey brain
showing the parcellation of the agranular frontal and posterior
parietal cortex. Intraparietal, arcuate and cingulated sulci are shown
unfolded. For the nomenclature and definition of the agranular frontal
and posterior parietal areas, see text. AI, inferior arcuate sulcus; AS,
superior arcuate sulcus; C, central sulcus; Ca, calcarine fissure; Cg,
cingulated sulcus; DLPF, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; IO, inferior
occipital sulcus; L, lateral fissure; Lu, lunate sulcus; P, principal sulcus;
PO, parieto-occipital sulcus; ST, superior temporal sulcus; VLPF,
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.
connections of these motor areas, and draw hypotheses on their
possible functional role.
Descending Motor Pathways and Intrinsic Motor
Connections
As a whole, the motor cortex is source of different descending
motor pathways, each providing it with an access to the
brainstem and spinal motor centers. Strick and coworkers (Dum
and Strick, 1991; He et al., 1993, 1995) showed that the
corticospinal projections are somatotopically organized and that
originate both from the primary motor area and from all the
caudal premotor areas. Similarly, the face and mouth cortical
motor representations are sources of corticobulbar projections
(Morecraft et al., 2001). The corticospinal projections mostly
terminate in the intermediate zone of the spinal cord, and only
F1 is source of monosynaptic projections to spinal motor neurons
(Porter and Lemon, 1993). Thismeans that F1 is the final common
pathway, at the cortical level, for controlling skilled movements.
However, the presence of corticospinal projections from all the
caudal premotor areas clearly indicates that these areas are also
involved in generating and controlling movements, not only
through F1, but also in parallel with it, as also confirmed by the
evidence that each of them is also somatotopically connected with
F1. For example, a descending indirect pathway connecting the
caudal premotor area F5p with the cervical propriospinal system
was recently described and is deemed to be involved in the control
of dexterous fingersmovements (Sasaki et al., 2004; Isa et al., 2007;
Borra et al., 2010; see also Lemon, 2008; Alstermark and Isa, 2012).
Figure 2 depicts a schematic view of the descending pathways
enabling hand motor control.
In contrast, none of the rostral premotor areas project directly
to the spinal cord. Their descending projections reach different
parts of the brainstem (Keizer and Kuypers, 1989). Furthermore,
they are not directly connected with F1, and generally have a
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic view of the descending pathways
involved in the control of hand grasping. Caudal premotor areas
are involved in generating and controlling hand grasping movements
not only through the primary motor cortex, but also in parallel with it.
The red lines indicate the corticospinal projection from the primary
motor cortex to the cervical enlargement of the spinal cord. This is the
only pathway directly accessing the spinal motor neurons (see Lemon,
2008). The green solid lines indicate the descending projection from
the caudal premotor area F5p (Borra et al., 2010) to the reticulo-spinal
neurons and to the spinal propriospinal system (Isa et al., 2007). The
corticospinal projection from caudal premotor areas to the cervical
enlargement (dashed green line) are much weaker than those deriving
from the primary motor cortex. IN, interneurons; MN, motoneurons;
PN, propriospinal neurons; RSN, reticulo-spinal neurons.
widespread pattern of connections with other motor areas. The
radically different pattern of descending projection characterizing
rostral and caudal areas hints to the fact that they probably are
subserving different functions. The rostral areas are thought to
be only indirectly involved in the generation of motor behavior
through their sub-cortical projections and through their cortical
connections with the caudal premotor areas.
Cortico-Cortical Connections
The cortical connections of the frontal motor areas involve
mainly two brain regions: parietal cortex and prefrontal cortex
(see Rizzolatti et al., 1998, 2014; Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001).
The connections between frontal motor and posterior parietal
areas are very strong and reciprocal. Anatomical and functional
evidence show that the posterior parietal cortex consists in a
mosaic of areas similar to the motor cortex (Figure 1), each area
is involved in processing specific aspects of sensory information
and controlling different effectors (e.g., mouth, hand, arm, and
eyes). In general, most IPL areas and the posterior areas of the
SPL process either strictly visual or visual and somatosensory
information, while the rostral areas of the SPL mainly deal with
somatosensory information (Hyvärinen, 1982; Caminiti et al.,
1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1997; Wise et al., 1997; Colby, 1998;
Rizzolatti and Matelli, 2003; Rozzi et al., 2008). A series of
largely segregated anatomical circuits linking parietal and motor
areas can be identified according to the pattern of predominant
connections. These circuits integrates specific motor and sensory
signals and participate to particular aspects of sensory-motor
transformations, and should be thus considered the functional
units of the cortical motor system. The processing undertaken
by these functional units results in the generation of potential
motor acts. In the following section, we describe the anatomy and
function of one of these circuits (AIP-F5), and discuss its role in
transforming visual information about an object into potential
motor acts appropriate to grasp it.
The second strongest source of cortical connections of the
motor areas is the prefrontal cortex. Prefrontal connections
primarily involve the rostral premotor areas (Barbas, 1988; Preuss
and Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Luppino et al., 1993; Lu et al., 1994;
Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001; Saleem and Kondo, 2008; Gerbella
et al., 2010, 2013; Borra et al., 2011). Specifically, the dorsal part
of the lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPF) projects to F7, its ventral
part (VLPF) projects to F5a, whereas bothDLPF andVLPFproject
to F6. Our knowledge of the anatomo-functional organization of
the prefrontal cortex is much less detailed than that of the parietal
cortex. It is generally accepted that these regions are involved in
“higher order” functions such as working memory, planning of
actions, and motivation (see Miller and Cohen, 2001; Tanji and
Hoshi, 2008). Thus, these projections could play a role in selecting
the potential motor acts generated as the result of sensorimotor
transformations, weighting their suitability according to context,
abstract rules, memorized information, and behavioral goals. The
interplay between prefrontal cortex and frontal motor areas could
be at the basis of the transformation of potential actions into actual
actions.
Functional Properties of Motor Neurons:
From Grasping to Intention
Visuo-Motor Transformations for Grasping
Grasping requires the adjustment of hand conformation to the
size and shape of an object. A very efficient way of to accomplish
this duty has evolved in the motor system. It consists in a direct
linkage between the representations of object physical features
and of potential motor acts, allowing the capacity of coding
objects in term of actions to execute upon them. The process
of transforming object properties into corresponding potential
grasping actions relies on a specific circuit linking parietal area
AIP and premotor area F5. The neural properties of these areas
have been widely studied. We know that area F5 contains purely
motor and sensory-motor neurons, some of which responsive to
the presentation of visual stimuli (Rizzolatti et al., 1988). These
F5 visuo-motor neurons fall into two main classes: canonical and
mirror neurons, although, recently, the additional hybrid class
of “canonical-mirror” neurons has been identified (Bonini et al.,
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2014). In this section, we will describe the properties and the
functional role of the canonical neurons.
Canonical neurons aremostly located in area F5p and discharge
during the presentation of 3D objects (Murata et al., 1997; Raos
et al., 2006). They have been systematically studied by means
of a paradigm that allows one to separate activity related to
object presentation, action preparation and action execution. For
the major part, canonical neurons selectively respond to objects
of a certain size, shape and orientation. Typically, their visual
and motor specificity are congruent, and it was demonstrated
that their activity does not depends on attention to stimuli,
intention to act, or motor preparation (Murata et al., 1997).
The most likely explanation for the canonical neurons discharge
proposes that object presentation activates a representation of
the observed object in motor format. In other words, when an
object appears in the visual scene, the discharge of a specific
set of canonical neurons code a potential grasping act congruent
with the physical properties of the presented object. Note that
this occurs independently of whether the act will be actually
executed or not. In support of this explanation is the observation
that a canonical neuron can show a visual response of the same
intensity to the presentation of objects of different shape that
are grasped in the same way (Murata et al., 1997; Raos et al.,
2006).
As mentioned above, F5 has strong anatomical connections
with the AIP area (Luppino et al., 1999; Borra et al., 2008; Gerbella
et al., 2011). The functional properties of the neurons located in
this area have been studied using the same paradigm adopted for
the study of F5 canonical neurons (Taira et al., 1990; Sakata et al.,
1995; Murata et al., 2000). By using this paradigm, AIP neurons
have been divided into three classes: motor-dominant, visual and
motor, and visual-dominant neurons. Motor-dominant neurons
discharge during grasping either if the action is performed in
light or in darkness, but do not fire during simple object fixation.
Visual-dominant neurons discharge during grasping in light and
during object fixation, but not when grasping is performed in
darkness. Finally, visual and motor neurons discharge stronger
during grasping in light than in darkness, and also discharge
during object fixation.
The evidence that AIP and F5 are nodes of a circuit involved in
visuo-motor transformations for grasping was strongly supported
by inactivation studies. In particular, the inactivation of either
AIP (Gallese et al., 1994) or F5 (Fogassi et al., 2001) has been
shown to cause important deficits in shaping the hand according
to the stimulus physical characteristics during hand transport
before landing on the object. Note that, once touched, the object
is correctly grasped, thus showing the lack of pure motor deficits.
Several models have been proposed to explain the role of AIP
and F5 in visuo-motor transformation for grasping (Taira et al.,
1990; Jeannerod et al., 1995; Fagg and Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti
and Luppino, 2001; Fluet et al., 2010). Despite the fact that there
is no complete agreement among these models, they share the
common idea that when an object is presented, AIP neurons
extract specific aspects of its intrinsic features and provide F5
with a multiple description of the possible ways to grasp it.
This corresponds to what Gibson defined as affordances (Gibson,
1979). The lateral prefrontal cortex would activates a set of AIP
and F5 neurons according to the behavioral goal, object nature,
and context. Indeed, an object can be grasped with various types
of grip depending not only on its physical features, but also on
the different behavioral contexts. For instance, in recent studies,
monkeys were trained to associate two different grip-types with
corresponding color cues. The results showed that in both AIP
and F5, a set of neurons were active after cue presentation,
showing context-dependent grasp planning activity (Baumann
et al., 2009; Fluet et al., 2010). The information about the chosen
grip, according to the models, would be then sent from F5 to F1,
where the movements are coded, and the final command for the
execution is generated. Indeed, recent physiological experiments
demonstrated that the activation of F5 is able to generate object-
oriented actions through the modulation of F1 motor output
(Cerri et al., 2003; Shimazu et al., 2004; Prabhu et al., 2009).
Note, however, that the existence of corticospinal projections
from F5p (see above; Borra et al., 2010) indicates that this area
could be involved in the generation and control of movements
not only through F1, but also in parallel with it (Figure 2). In
particular, the F5 connections with the cervical propriospinal
neurons appears to be involved in the control of dexterous
fingers movements (Isa et al., 2007; Kinoshita et al., 2012). The
exact functional role of these projections is still only partially
understood, but evidence suggest that they may play a role in the
functional recovery observed after lesions of the motor cortex. In
particular, in New World monkeys, the ventral premotor hand
field expands and develops new cortical connections after lesions
of the primary motor cortex (Frost et al., 2003; Dancause et al.,
2005, 2006; see Nudo, 2007). In macaque, it has been shown that
after intensive post-lesion motor training, the ventral premotor
hand field (including F5p) undergoes plastic changes and shows
recovery-related increases in activity (Nishimura et al., 2007; see
Nishimura and Isa, 2012).
Coding Grasping Goal: The “Vocabulary
of Motor Acts”
Planning and executing an action, such as grasping and eating
an apple, implies to have an overarching goal (to eat the apple),
to select the appropriate sequence of motor acts—each with its
specific motor goal (reaching, grasping, bringing to the mouth,
biting)—and to execute the sequence ofmovements forming each
motor act (see Rizzolatti et al., 2014). Attaining action goals
relies on the precise integration of the processes carried out at
each of these hierarchical levels and on their accurate timing.
It is well known that area F1 and F5 are mainly involved in
movement implementation, and in coding the goal of motor
acts, respectively. Area F5 neurons typically encode motor acts
performed with the hand or the mouth (Kurata and Tanji, 1986;
Gentilucci et al., 1988; Rizzolatti et al., 1988;Hepp-Reymond et al.,
1994; Ferrari et al., 2003). Electrophysiological studies revealed
that a large proportion of F5 neurons encode specific motor
acts such as grasping or tearing, rather than simple movements
(Rizzolatti et al., 1988). Typically, an F5 hand motor neuron
discharge during finger movements aimed at taking possession
of an object (grasping) but not during similar movements aimed
at different goals (e.g., scratching). In addition, F5 neurons
activates when the same goal is achieved by using different
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effectors/movements (e.g., taking possession either with the right
hand, the left hand, or the mouth, Figure 3A). Interestingly, many
neurons code specific grip types such as precision grip, finger
prehension or whole hand prehension. Concerning the timing of
grasping, some neurons discharge during the whole unfolding of
the motor act, and others during a specific part of it (e.g., shaping
of the hand).
Altogether, these data led to the proposal that F5 contains a
“vocabulary” of motor acts (Rizzolatti et al., 1988). The “words”
of this motor vocabulary are represented by different populations
of neurons, some coding the general goal of a motor act, others
coding how a specific motor act has to be executed or specifying
the temporal aspects of the motor act to be executed (see
Jeannerod et al., 1995). Neuroanatomical data show that F5 is
densely connected with the parietal areas AIP, PF, PFG, and
SII (Petrides and Pandya, 1984; Matelli et al., 1986; Cavada
and Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Luppino et al., 1999; Rozzi et al.,
2006; Borra et al., 2008; Gerbella et al., 2011). Areas F5 and
PFG also share numerous functional properties (Leinonen et al.,
1979; Hyvärinen, 1981; Rozzi et al., 2008; Bonini et al., 2010),
and both contain motor neurons coding goal directed motor
acts. A definitive demonstration that motor neurons indeed code
motor acts has been provided by a study in which the same
motor goal was achieved by employing opposite movements
(Umiltá et al., 2008). Monkeys were trained to grasp objects
using “normal” pliers, that is pliers that require hand closure in
order to take possession of the object, and “reverse” pliers that
require hand opening to achieve the same goal. The correlation
between the neuron discharge and the hand movements revealed
that a population of F5 neurons code goal achievement (i.e.,
taking possession of the target object) independently of the
type of fingers movement employed (flexion or extension,
Figure 3B).
Coding Motor Intention
Based on the data described in the previous section, a dissociation
seems to exist between goal and movement in the motor system.
One can therefore hypothesize that some population of neurons
would code an even higher level of goal representation, possibly
reflecting the overarching goal of the action, and expect to find
neurons discharging differently during the execution of a motor
act (e.g., grasping) according to the overarching goal of the whole
action (e.g., eating). Recently, a series of experiments were carried
out to test this hypothesis (Fogassi et al., 2005; Bonini et al., 2010,
2012). Grasping neurons were recorded from areas PFG and F5 in
two conditions: in the first condition, the monkey grasped a piece
of food and brought it to the mouth for eating; in the second, the
monkey grasped anobject or a piece of food in order to place it into
a container. Some neurons discharged stronger during grasping to
eat, and weaker or did not discharge at all during grasping to place
in the container. Others had an opposite behavior (Figure 3C).
Note that the differential discharge occurred during the actual
grasping execution, and that the grasping act itself—consisting
in closing the hand on the object—was exactly the same in
the two conditions. The kinematics of reaching movements, the
grip force exerted, the type of object involved—metallic cube or
food—or the amount of underlying motivation could not account
for the differential activation of the neurons in the two conditions
(Fogassi et al., 2005; Bonini et al., 2010). The discharge of these
motor neurons, besides coding goals at the motor acts level, also
reflects the overarching goal of the actions. Such neurons could
play an important role in linking the specific motor acts belonging
to an action in an appropriate motor chain, allowing the correct
and fluid execution of the corresponding movement sequence.
Beside this role in kinematic fluidity, their activation could have
significant implications at a cognitive level. The firing of these
neurons, together with that of the other neurons involved in the
same action, represent the neural correlate of the overarching goal
underlying the action, that is, the motor intention of the acting
individual. Having a motor system wired as such could have been
important in the phylogenetic development of the ability to read
other’s intentions. One of the mechanisms possibly underlying
this capacity relies on the mirror system and is be discussed in
the following sections.
The Mirror Mechanism
The discovery of the mirror mechanism radically changed our
views on the functional role of the motor system. It is now largely
accepted that the same neurons involved inmotor coding can also
underpin social abilities such as understanding actions, reading
others’ intentions and programming contextually appropriate
motor responses (see Rizzolatti et al., 2014). The existence of
mirror neurons also shed light on how some basic processes
involved in social cognition can bemediated by themotor system.
Altogether, these functions represent fundamental aspects for
social relations in primate and human societies (Sebanz and
Knoblich, 2009; Bach et al., 2011; see Sebanz and Knoblich,
2008).
Simply put, mirror neurons discharge when a subject either
actually performs a motor act or simply observes the same
act being performed by someone else (Figures 4A,B). In other
words, the observation of an action triggers in the observer’s
brain a representation of that action in a motor format (Di
Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al.,
1996a; see Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010; Rizzolatti et al.,
2014). The fact that an action representation in motor format
can be activated by mere observation raise an important
question: why don’t we automatically move when observing
an action? Recent single neuron experiment showed that the
activity of a significant portion of pyramidal tract neurons of
area F5 is modulated by action observation (Kraskov et al.,
2009), and either increase or decrease their discharge. This
finding indicates that mirror neurons activity can be transmitted
to the spinal cord. Considering that more than one-fourth
of pyramidal tract neurons show suppression of discharge
during observation, while increase firing rate during active
movement, the authors suggested that this inhibitory effect might
play a role in preventing movement generation during action
observation.
Mirror Neurons and Action Understanding
It has been proposed that the mirror mechanism, by matching the
visual description of a motor act with its motor representation
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FIGURE 3 | Goal and intention encoding in areas F5 and PFG. (A) Upper
part, left: lateral view of the monkey brain showing the location of area F5; right
and lower part: discharge of an F5 neuron active during grasping with the
mouth, the right hand and the left hand. Raster and histograms are aligned with
the moment in which the monkey touches the target object. Abscissae: time;
ordinates: spikes per bin; bin width: 20 ms. Modified from Rizzolatti et al. (1988).
(B) Example of an F5 neuron discharging during grasping with normal and
reverse pliers. Upper part: pliers and hand movements necessary for grasping
with the two types of pliers. Lower part: rasters and histograms of the neuronal
discharge during grasping with pliers. The alignments are with the end of the
grasping closure phase (asterisks). The traces below each histogram indicate
the hand position, recorded with a potentiometer, expressed as function of the
distance between the pliers handles. When the trace goes down, the hand
closes, when it goes up, it opens. The values on the vertical axes indicate the
voltage change measured with the potentiometer. Other conventions as in (A).
Modified from Umiltá et al. (2008). (C) Example of motor neuron of area PFG
modulated by action intention. Upper part left: lateral view of the monkey brain
showing the location of area PFG. Upper part right: paradigm used for the
motor task. The monkey, starting from a fixed position, reaches and grasps a
piece of food or an object, then it brings the food to the mouth and eats it (I,
grasp-to-eat), or places it into a container (II/III, grasp-to-place). Lower part left:
activity of three IPL neurons during grasping in the two actions. Rasters and
histograms are aligned with the moment when the monkey touched the object
to be grasped. Red bars: monkey releases the hand from the starting position.
Green bars: monkey touches the container. Conventions as in (A). Modified
from Fogassi et al. (2005).
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FIGURE 4 | Examples of F5 mirror neurons. (A) Lateral view of the
monkey brain showing the location of area F5c. (B) Mirror neuron
responding during observation and execution of a hand grasping
motor act. Conventions as in Figure 3A. Modified from Rizzolatti et al.
(1996a). (C) Examples of mirror neurons whose visual response is
modulated by the distance at which the observed act is performed.
Left: experimental paradigm. I the monkey grasps a piece of food. II
and III the experimenter grasps a piece of food located in the monkey
peripersonal or extrapersonal space, respectively. Right: Cell 1: the
visual response is higher during observation of grasping performed in
the extrapersonal space; Cell 2: the visual response is higher during
observation of grasping performed in the peripersonal space. Each
panel shows a raster plot and the spike density function of the neuron
response. Modified from Caggiano et al. (2009).
in terms of goal, allows the observer to understand what
another individual is doing. Such a process would be possible
because the observation of an act automatically retrieve its
motor representation by tapping into the observer’s motor
vocabulary (described in the previous section, see Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia, 2010; Rizzolatti and Fogassi, 2014; Rizzolatti et al.,
2014). This implies that a representation of the motor goal of
an act can be triggered by sensory information. The nature of
the sensory information capable of activating mirror neurons
has been investigated in two neurophysiological studies. In the
first, mirror neurons have been demonstrated to discharge both
when the monkey can fully observe an experimenter grasping
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an object, and when he can only see part of the action, due
to its crucial part (the hand-object interaction) being hidden
by a screen (Umiltá et al., 2001). Interestingly, there was no
neuronal discharge if the monkey knew that there was no object
to grasp behind the screen, suggesting that, in the absence
of a full visual description, mirror neurons use mnemonic-
contextual information to retrieve the motor representation of
the observed motor act. In the second study, sensory information
about the motor act was presented to the monkey in an acoustic
and/or visual format. It revealed that some mirror neurons
(audio-visual mirror neurons), discharge not only during the
execution and the observation of a motor act producing a sound
(e.g., the crackling sound of breaking a peanut), but were also
activated when the monkey simply heard the sound made by
the action (Kohler et al., 2002; Keysers et al., 2003). Altogether,
these data indicate that mirror neurons respond to the goal
of others’ motor acts also in partial or total absence of visual
cues.
Mirror Neurons and Intention Coding
Some mirror neurons share an interesting property with purely
motor neurons and encode themotor intention behind the actions
performed by other individuals (Fogassi et al., 2005; Bonini
et al., 2010). A series of experiments was carried out to assess
a possible relation between motor intention and mirror neurons
activity. One way of testing this possibility was to verify whether
neurons discharging during the execution and observation of
grasping acts are influenced by the type of action in which the
grasping acts are embedded (Fogassi et al., 2005; Bonini et al.,
2010). In this purpose, grasping-related mirror neurons were
recorded from parietal area PFG and premotor area F5 while the
monkey executed a motor task (motor condition) and observed
the same task, performed by an experimenter (visual condition).
The experimental paradigm was the same as previously described
in the section “coding motor” intention: an identical grasping
act was embedded into two different actions, aimed at eating or
placing the target in a container, respectively. The results show
that in both the motor and visual condition a large proportion
of mirror neurons discharged differently during the observation
of the grasping act, when it was part of the two different actions
(action-goal-related mirror neurons). The neuronal selectivity for
the overarching goal expressed during grasping observation has
been interpreted as a prediction of the action outcome. Making
such a prediction is possible since the monkey knows that a
given context like the type of target object or the presence of a
container is followed by grasping-to-place action. Note, however
that these neurons are not activated by contextual cues such as
the observation of the target object or of the scene, but by action
observation. Accordingly, it was hypothesized that when one of
these neurons is activated by the observation of a grasping motor
act that is part of a specific motor action (grasp-to-eat or grasp-to-
place), it triggers the motor circuitry that constitutes the internal
representation of the overarching goal of the sequential action.
Thus, mirror neurons, besides the capacity of coding motor acts,
provide individuals with a mechanism for understanding others’
intentions (Fogassi et al., 2005; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010;
Rizzolatti et al., 2014).
Mirror Neurons and the Social Context: Space
and Agency
Understanding the behavior of others’ is one of the building
block of social cognition. However, in social animals in which
object-oriented behaviors usually occur in the presence of other
individuals, understanding the action goal and the intention
behind it is not sufficient to frame this action in its social
context. In this purpose, it is also very relevant to evaluate actions
with respect to the position in space where they occur, and
especially with respect to the observer’s position. For example,
if an individual is grasping an object close to an observer, an
interaction is possible. The observer has the actual possibility to
interfere with the grasping action and prevent it to happen, or
cooperate to it. Cooperative behaviors are common in humans,
but are also documented in monkeys (Mendres and de Waal,
2000; Visalberghi et al., 2000; Visco-Comandini et al., 2015). If
the mirror mechanism was only involved in action and intention
understanding, the spatial location of the observed action and the
vantage point of the observer would be irrelevant. However, if
space also plays a role in tuning motor responses appropriate to
others’ actions, as first proposed by Jeannerod (2006), these spatial
factors could possibly modulate the neural discharge of mirror
neurons. This hypothesis has been empirically tested in different
experiments. The results showed that, although in most cases the
visual response of mirror neurons is invariant with respect to
spatial features, the discharge of some of them ismodulated by the
direction of the hand movement, the space sector (right or left) in
which the motor act occurs or the hand (right or left) used by the
observed agent (Gallese et al., 1996; Rozzi et al., 2008).
The effect of the distance at which an action occurs on the
discharge of mirror neurons was systematically tested in a recent
experiment (Caggiano et al., 2009). In this study the same motor
act was executed within the monkey reaching space (peripersonal
space) or outside it (extrapersonal space). About half of the studied
mirror neurons discharged differently in the two conditions. Of
them, 50% discharged stronger when the monkey observed the
experimenter grasping a piece of food in its peripersonal space and
50% in the extrapersonal space (Figure 4C). Crucially, the authors
tested whether, in these mirror neurons, space was represented
in terms of a metric representation—the geometric distance
between the action and the monkey—or in terms of operational
representation—the pragmatic space where the monkey can
actually act. To this end, a transparent barrier was introduced
between themonkey and the sitewhere the experimenter executed
the action. In this condition the monkey could see the action,
but was prevented from interacting with the object located within
its peripersonal space. If a metric representation is at play in the
mirror neurons code, peripersonal and extrapersonal space would
remain unchanged, while if an operational representation occurs,
the introduction of the barrier would lead to a remapping of
the peripersonal into extrapersonal space. The results show that
when the barrier was introduced, extrapersonal mirror neurons
started discharging also when the observed action was performed
within the peripersonal space, as if this latter were displaced far
away. Taken together, these data suggest that a subpopulation of
mirror neurons can code differently others’ actions depending on
the space sector in which they occur. It is very likely that space
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location and distance are coded within the mirror neuron system
in relation to the often vital possibility to interact or not with
others. Thus, mirror neurons, besides being involved in action
understanding, could also be important for choosing the motor
response appropriate to others’ actions in their specific behavioral
context.
The issue of space coding is very important also because a
large number of primates actions is directed toward oneself (e.g.,
bringing objects to the mouth), while most of the studies about
the mirror system focused on actions directed away from one’s
body (e.g., reach for and grasp an object). It is well known that
in the fundus of the intraparietal sulcus (area VIP) there are
bimodal neurons, responding to visual and tactile stimuli, whose
tactile receptive fields are located predominantly on the face and
the visual receptive fields are in spatial register with the tactile
ones (Colby et al., 1993; Duhamel et al., 1998). The electrical
stimulation of this area evokes face movements and defensive
movements of the arm toward the face (Cooke et al., 2003).
Ishida et al. (2010) studied the neural properties of a population
of these bimodal neurons, delimiting the extension in depth of
their peripersonal space in monkeys either alone, or facing an
experimenter. Typically, when a visual stimulus was presented
outside the peripersonal space, at more than onemeter of distance
from the tactile receptive field, no visual response was recorded.
However, when an experimenter was standing in front of the
monkey at the same distance and a stimulus was moved close to
his/her body part corresponding to the neuron tactile receptive
field, the response appeared. In other words, other’s body space
was matched to the monkey’s one. This result indicates a possible
way for encoding others’ peripersonal space, and might extend
the role of the mirror mechanism in action understanding to
others individuals’ actions aimed at themselves. However, in this
study the motor responses of the neurons have not been recorded,
and it is impossible to tell whether these neurons actually were
mirror neurons, nonetheless, it is known that area VIP is strictly
connected with premotor area F4 (Matelli et al., 1986; Barbas and
Pandya, 1987; Cavada and Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Andersen et al.,
1990; Lewis and Van Essen, 2000), where peripersonal space is
encoded in terms of reaching movements (Gentilucci et al., 1988;
Fogassi et al., 1996; see Graziano, 2006). It is plausible, therefore,
that the visual responses actually represent potential motor acts
directed toward specific body parts (Gentilucci et al., 1988; Fogassi
et al., 1996).
A subsequent study investigated a further important aspect of
the observed actions, that is the view-dependence of the visual
responses of mirror neurons (Caggiano et al., 2011). To this
purpose the monkey was required to observe movies showing the
same grasping motor act from three different points of view: in
the subjective perspective (0°), and in two types of third-person
views, a lateral (90°) and a frontal (180°) one. Among the tested
mirror neurons, about three-fourth showed a preference for one
of the vantage points, encoding in equal percentage the three
different perspectives employed. On the base of these results it has
been proposed that view-independent mirror neurons encode the
goal of the observed motor act irrespective of the visual details
of the scene, while view-dependent mirror neurons provide a
link between the goal of the motor act and its pictorial aspects.
Similarly to the mirror neurons modulated by peripersonal or
extra-personal space, view-dependent mirror neurons could be
important for preparing an adequate response to the observed
action. These neurons could be part of a neural circuit of the
“social brain” coding the spatial relations at the roots of basic
social interactions.
In all the reported studies on mirror neurons, actions were
unidirectional and non-interactive, while in nature, most often,
monkeys interact within complex social environments in which
different individuals share the same social space. Here we refer
to social interactions as the acts of two or more individual
taking into account of other’s actual or potential actions or
intentions. By combining a motion capture system with chronic
multielectrode recording from different cortical areas (multi-
dimensional recording), Fujii et al. (2007, 2008) were able to study
the neural activity from monkeys’ parietal and premotor cortex
in a social context. When two monkeys were sitting one close to
the other, and could reach for and grasp food without interacting,
parietal activity resulted to be strongly tuned to the use of the arm
contralateral to the recorded hemisphere. However, when the food
was put in a shared space and a social conflict emerged between
the monkeys, the neurons developed different combinations of
preferences to self and other motion (Fujii et al., 2007). This
evidence indicates that parietal neurons can recognize social cues
and provide other areas with a neural code modulated by social
information. The same authors also described the responses of
premotor and parietal neurons during the observation of action
in a task in which two monkeys were present, but could not
interact (Fujii et al., 2008).During action execution both premotor
and parietal neurons showed a strong preference for actions
performedwith the arm contralateral to the recording hemisphere
(right arm). During the observation of the other monkey action,
the premotor neurons preferred the other monkey right arm
movements, while the parietal neurons typically lost this laterality
preference, showing a wider spectrum of combinatorial responses
to own/other right/left responses. Indeed, the arm used (right or
left) in a specific context (position of the food on the right or left
side) is very relevant to understand the intention of an action.
Accordingly, the authors propose that the premotor neurons code
information on action’s agent and effector as primitives of action
recognition within the mirror network, while parietal neurons
represent the social space and participate in recognizing others’
actions with respect to one’s own actions (Fujii et al., 2008).
The mirror mechanism can enable to understand others’
action, but in this process, the sense of agency appears to be
revoked: the neurons are active both when I act and when I see
someone else acting, without moving. The lack of synchronicity
between the vision of an action and the somato-motor signals
related to action execution probably represents the crucial
information for attributing the action to self or others (see
Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000; Gazzola and Keysers, 2009; Pitti
et al., 2009). Interestingly, different studies described neurons
activated by the observation of actions but not discharging during
action execution, in the premotor, parietal and temporal cortex
(Perrett et al., 1989; Gallese et al., 1996; Fujii et al., 2008). It was
proposed that these neurons, by separating visual and somato-
motor information, could play a role in the attribution of agency
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to others (Fujii et al., 2008). The same authors also propose that
this function does not rely on single cortical areas, but on a larger
cortical network capable of integrating visual and somato-motor
informations. Possible networks involved in action observation
and participating to this function are described in the following
section.
Anatomo-Functional Mirror Pathways
Among the cortical areas involved in the processing of visual
information, those located in the superior temporal sulcus
(STS) are generally considered as the fundamental node
coding biological information. In fact, STS contains neurons
coding visual information about eye/gaze direction, body/limbs
orientation and movement, facial expressions, and biological
motion (Bruce et al., 1981; Perrett et al., 1989; Puce et al.,
1998; Pelphrey et al., 2003; Tsao and Livingstone, 2008). These
features are among the most relevant aspects needed by an
individual to interpret others’ behavior, and, for this reason,
STS is generally considered as the initial stage in processing
social cues. To date, very few studies have been done to
elucidate how the mirror system interplays with STS or with
other parts the “social brain.” Notwithstanding the paucity of
available data on this topic, a few studies are unveiling possible
pathways by which social information can reach mirror neurons’
computation.
A recent study employed fMRI technique in the monkey
to identify the frontal areas active during the observation of
motor acts (Nelissen et al., 2005). By using anatomically defined
regions of interest, the authors found that viewing videos
showing a hand grasping an object activates F5a, F5p, and the
prefrontal areas 45A, 45B, and 46. When the video showed the
whole individual grasping an object, and not only a hand, the
activation also involved F5c. This indicates that there are multiple
representations of others’ actions in the monkey frontal cortex
and that they can be sensitive to different features. F5a, F5p and
the prefrontal areas appear to encode the action as such, while
F5c action representation is more centered on the agent doing the
action. This result has two important implications: first, a context-
dependent processing of the act of grasping is taking place in
F5c; second, an input coming from areas processing the visual
features of the scene (like STS), makes its way to the premotor
cortex.
A subsequent anatomo-functional studymade byNelissen et al.
(2011) investigated how visual information about action can reach
the frontal areas, and concentrated on STS and posterior parietal
cortex fMRI activation in the monkeys during the observation of
grasping acts. They also correlated functional with connectional
data obtained bymeans of neural tracers injections. The employed
videos activated areas in the lower and upper banks of STS, and
in the IPL. An analysis based on regions of interest showed that
grasping observation activates stronger than control conditions
three IPL areas (PFG, on the cortical convexity, AIP and LIP in the
lower bank of intraparietal sulcus) and five STS regions (MT/V5,
LST, and LB2 in the lower bank, FST in the fundus and STPm
in the upper bank). Note that a recent electrophysiological study
directly demonstrated the presence of mirror neurons in the AIP
area (Pani et al., 2014).
In order to assess which of the STS areas active during
action observation are actually connected with the mirror areas,
retrograde tracers were injected in the parietal nodes of themirror
system (AIP and PFG). After AIP injections, a widespread STS
labeling were found, but the most consistent labeling in all cases
was in the lower bank sector LB2 and in the inferotemporal
cortex near the lip of STS. Injections in PFG resulted in consistent
labeling in STS upper bank sectors MSTd, STPm, and UB1. Note
that, of them, only STPmwas found to be specifically active during
action observation.
This integrated anatomo-functional approach led to the
identification of two functional pathways involved in action
observation linking STS, IPL, and PMv (Figure 5, red and blue).
One links STS sector STPm with parietal area PFG that, in
turn, is connected with premotor area F5c. The other pathway
connects LB2 with AIP that, in turn, is connected with F5a and
F5p. Both routes process information necessary for understanding
the observed motor act, but each provides a different type of
information, possibly playing a specific role in understanding
the intention underlying it. In particular, the STPm-PFG-F5c
pathway is more concerned with the agent doing the action, while
the LB2-AIP-F5a/p one with the details of grip and object identity
(Nelissen et al., 2011).
These pathways show that the parietal regions containing
mirror neurons have a direct access to STS information about
biological motion, crucial for coding the observed agent’s actions
and intentions. This direct access implies that PFG/AIP would
be a first node where the neural codes for grasping and for
social information—like gaze, head, body, or limb orientation or
direction—are integrated in a common motor representation that
becomes available for mirroring others’ actions. This integrated
code in which grasping is linked with social information would
then be sent to F5 in the premotor cortex.
A further pathway links area 45B in the prearcuate cortex
with LST and LB1 in the lower bank of STS, and LIPa in the
lower bank of intraparietal sulcus (Figure 5, green). Note that
monkey area 45B is known to be part of the oculomotor system,
probably representing the gateway of highly integrated prefrontal
and orbitofrontal information to this system (Moschovakis, 2004;
Gerbella et al., 2010). It was proposed that the LST/LB1-LIP-
45B pathway could play a role in oculomotor control during
action observation (Gerbella et al., 2010; Nelissen et al., 2011).
Indeed, gaze behavior mirroring has been found in LIP of
macaque monkeys where a sub-population of neurons discharge
both when monkeys direct their gaze in a given direction and
when they look at a static image of another monkey having
the gaze oriented in that same direction (Shepherd et al.,
2009). The areas of the LST/LB1-LIP-45B pathway are activated
by action observation (Nelissen et al., 2011), but there is no
evidence of the presence of grasping mirror neurons in any of
them. So the question remains: where does the integration of
information related to grasping and gaze direction occurs? This
question is even more relevant considering the importance of
parsing others’ gaze direction for deciphering their intention
(see Klein et al., 2009). The existence of this pathway raise the
possibility that STS information about biologically or socially
relevant gaze targets reaches oculomotor areas LIP and 45B.
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FIGURE 5 | STS–IPL-F5 grasping observation networks in the
monkey. (A) Lateral view of a macaque brain showing locations of three
regions involved in action observation: inferior arcuate sulcus (IA),
Intraparietal sulcus and inferior parietal lobule (IP), and superior temporal
sulcus (ST). (B) Flattened representation of inferior arcuate, intraparietal
and superior temporal sulci. Visual information on observed actions can be
sent from STS through parietal cortex to premotor area F5 along two
functional routes: a STPm–PFG–F5c, agent-related action observation
pathway (red lines) and a LB2–AIP–F5a/p object-related action observation
pathway (blue lines). Visual information from STS can also reach parietal
and prefrontal areas involved in oculomotion, through the
LB1/LST-LIP-45B oculomotion-related action observation pathway (green
lines). The arrows specify the functional routes. For abbreviations, see text.
Modified from Nelissen et al. (2011).
However, “oculomotor mirroring,” confirmed in LIP, remains
untested in prefrontal cortex. One could reasonably expect to
find a population of neurons mirroring gaze behavior in area
45B. Note that in this pathway, gaze information would still
be segregated from the one coding grasping. The anatomical
pathways through which gaze mirroring would reach the parietal
and premotor areas of grasping mirroring still remain to
be described, but probably include the prefrontal cortex (see
below).
Summing up, the STS information about social cues deriving
from biological motion analysis could reach the mirror system
directly (STPm-PFG-F5c and LB2-AIP-F5a/p pathways) or
indirectly through an “oculomotor” mirroring system (LST/LB1-
LIP-45B pathway). These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive,
and thus far, there is no data directly confirming any of them.
However, there are indirect behavioral and electrophysiological
evidence suggesting that information about gaze direction and
action observation converge and probably become integrated in
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the same neural code. The behavioral data comes, from a well-
known human study showing that subjects display the same gaze
pattern when performing a grasping action and when observing
another individual performing the same action (Flanagan and
Johansson, 2003). The electrophysiological evidence comes from
preliminary data showing that in monkeys area F5, the activity of
some mirror neurons is modulated by the gaze direction of the
observed agent (Coudé et al., 2013).
Prefrontal Cortex and Mirror Network
Functional MRI studies demonstrated that prefrontal area 46 is
involved in action observation (Nelissen et al., 2005) and motor-
related activity in the ventral prefrontal cortex has been described
(Tanila et al., 1992; Hoshi et al., 1998; Rozzi et al., 2011). More
recently, connectional studies on the ventral prefrontal cortex
indicated that a specific sector of ventral area 46 (rostral part of
46VC) and area 12 (intermediate 12r) is connected with different
nodes of the mirror pathways (Borra et al., 2011; Gerbella et al.,
2013). These nodes include rostral premotor area F5a, IPL areas
PFG and AIP and a sector of the ventral bank of rostral STS
sector, which overlaps with the fMRI sites activated by action
observation. Altogether, these evidence indicate that certain parts
of the prefrontal cortexmight be considered as actual components
of the mirror system, but electrophysiological confirmation of
this hypothesis is still lacking. A possible role of the prefrontal
cortex within the mirror system, could be to provide the motor
representations of the parietal and motor areas with mnemonic
and contextual information. Themirror system access to this kind
of information could, for instance, allow action understanding
when the target object is not actually visible during the unfolding
of a grasping action (Umiltá et al., 2001). It could also enable
intention understanding by retrieving the meaning of contextual
cues previously associated to specific actions (Fogassi et al.,
2005). In addition, the ventral prefrontal cortex could provide the
parietal and premotor cortex with social contextual cues. Such
cues would consist in information about gaze direction or body
part orientation, as elaborated in STS. Interestingly another sector
of ventral prefrontal cortex (caudal part of 46VC) is strongly
connected with frontal and parietal oculomotor areas, as well as
with the STS and the other sectors of area 46. This pattern of
connections could represent a pathway, though indirect, linking
the oculomotor system with the mirror system.
Note that the connections between prefrontal areas and mirror
areas are bidirectional. This implies that, from the one side,
the VLPF can modulate mirror neuron activity by sending
mnemonic and contextual information, from the other, the
parieto-premotor areas could provide the prefrontal cortex with
motor representations of action goals. Thus, a further role of
the prefrontal cortex could consist in recombining the observed
motor acts, captured by the parietal and premotor nodes of
the mirror system, to produce an action fitting the observed
model, allowing imitative learning, as suggested by studies
on humans (Buccino et al., 2004, see below). Further studies
will have to verify these hypotheses and assess the specific
contribution of the prefrontal areas, classically considered to exert
a top-down control on sensory and motor areas, to the mirror
system.
The Mirror System in Humans, An
Anatomo-Functional Perspective
The mirror system is thought to constitute a fundamental part of
the vertebrate motor system and has presumably been conserved
and adapted through different species, including humans. The
previous sections outlined its circuitry and functions in the
monkey. Technical and ethical limitations precludes to reach a
similar level of details in the description of the human mirror
system. However, studies using non-invasive techniques like brain
imaging, TMS and EEG/MEG have yield evidence that a mirror
system exists in humans (Fadiga et al., 1995; Grafton et al., 1996;
Rizzolatti et al., 1996b; Pfurtscheller and Neuper, 1997; Hari et al.,
1998; Cochin et al., 1999; Grèzes et al., 1999; Nishitani and Hari,
2000, 2002; Buccino et al., 2001; Gangitano et al., 2001; Perani
et al., 2001;Maeda et al., 2002;Muthukumaraswamy and Johnson,
2004; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Oberman et al., 2005; see Pineda, 2005;
Rizzolatti et al., 2014).
In EEG studies, Mu waves are detected in the 8–13 Hz
frequency range and are thought to be the result of synchronous
discharges by resting neurons in the sensorimotor region of the
brain (see Kuhlman, 1978; Anderson andDing, 2011).Mu rhythm
suppression occurs during motor preparation, action execution
(Neuper et al., 2006), but also during mental imagery and
action observation (Cochin et al., 1999; see Pineda, 2005). Brain
imaging studies demonstrated a consistent pattern of cortical
activity during action observation, involving a network of several
brain regions (see Caspers et al., 2010). This action observation
network includes Brodmann’s areas 44/45, lateral dorsal premotor
cortex, supplementary motor area, primary somatosensory
cortex, superior parietal lobule, intraparietal cortex, rostral
inferior parietal lobule, posterior middle temporal gyrus at the
transition to visual area V5, and fusiform face area/fusiform
body area.
Interestingly, this human mirror network largely overlaps
with the monkey one (IPL, PMv, and caudal part of inferior
frontal gyrus). However, various other areas are active in humans
during action observation. The only one description of a single
neuron mirroring mechanism was provided by Mukamel et al.
(2010), recording from areas not belonging to the classical
mirror system. The larger number of areas involved in action
observation in humans could depend on several factors. First,
most of monkey studies have been carried out by means of
single neuron recording. This technique is the only one capable
of demonstrating the presence of mirror neurons, but lacks the
possibility to explore large brain regions at the same time. Thus,
it is likely that the monkey mirror system has not yet been
fully mapped. This hypothesis is supported by 14C-deoxyglucose
autoradiography experiments in monkeys showing that further
regions beyond the classical mirror areas—including superior
parietal, somatosensory and primary motor areas—are activated
by action observation (Evangeliou et al., 2009; Raos et al.,
2014), although the actual presence of mirror neurons in these
areas is still to be confirmed. A second hypothesis is that the
mirror system in humans have expanded to additional cortical
areas, probably acquiring new functions. A third possibility is
that the brain activation evidenced by brain imaging studies
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during action observation could be related to different aspects of
visual processing or to motor preparation, and be independent
on the actual presence of mirror neurons. To our knowledge,
none of these hypotheses has been ultimately demonstrated.
An interesting attempt has been done by Gazzola and Keysers
(2009) in a recent fMRI study aimed at identifying the brain
regions activated by both action observation and action execution,
and thus, likely containing mirror neurons. The single-subject
analysis of unsmoothed fMRI data allowed the authors to
identify the voxels shared between action observation and action
execution in the classical IPL-PMv circuit, but also in the middle
cingulate, dorsal premotor, somatosensory, superior parietal, and
middle temporal cortex. The activation of areas not belonging
to the classically described parieto-premotor mirror circuit could
reflect sensory predictions from internal models (Wolpert and
Ghahramani, 2000; Gazzola and Keysers, 2009). This process
would complete and enrich the information about others’ actions
encoded by the classical mirror system. Further studies on action
observation and execution conducted in human and monkey by
means of brain imaging and electrophysiological techniques will
be important to demonstrate the presence ofmirror neurons in the
human cortex and to test and disentangle between the different
hypotheses proposed above.
The mirror mechanism, besides being involved in action
understanding, could also play a role in learning by imitation.
Buccino et al. (2004) specifically investigated this issue by means
of fMRI. In this study, naive participants were required to observe
images depicting the hand of an expert guitarist playing chords
and to imitate them after a delay. Action observation, as expected,
activated IPL, PMv and the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal
gyrus. Noteworthy, these areas together with the prefrontal cortex
(area 46 in the middle frontal gyrus) and the anterior mesial
cortex were active during the delay phase preceding movement
execution. The authors proposed that area 46 could recombine
the observedmotor acts, captured by the parieto-premotormirror
system in order to produce an act fitting the observed model.
Others’ Actions in Their Social Context
As mentioned above, the mirror mechanism in monkeys is
considered to be involved in coding others’ actions in their
social context (Fujii et al., 2007, 2008; Ishida et al., 2010; Visco-
Comandini et al., 2015). The term “social context” encompasses a
wide spectrum of settings and can refer to complex interactions,
especially in human societies. Whereas some forms of human
social interactions appear to be unique in their complexity, other
forms are more basic and are probably shared with other primates
(see Tomasello and Call, 1997). It is thus likely that the same
mirrormechanism is involved in themost basic social interactions
in different primate species. Human brain imaging and TMS data
seems to support this idea. Indeed, it has been showed that areas
pertaining to the mirror system are more strongly activated when
subjects performed complementary actions rather than when
they performed the same action as the one observed (Newman-
Norlund et al., 2007). TMS data by Sartori et al. (2011) also
point in the same direction and demonstrate that depending on
the context, motor-evoked potentials can reflect the observed
movement or an appropriate complementary movement. In this
experiment, when an object was present and the observer was
implicitly required to act upon the object in response to the
observed action, a shift from symmetrical motor resonance to
complementary activations of hand muscles was observed. Thus,
action observation does not inevitably lead to symmetrical motor
facilitation, that could be useful for imitation, but could also play
a role in successfully performing attuned joint actions.
Human data also showed that intentions and social contexts
affect kinematics, and conversely kinematics and contexts affect
intention understanding. The kinematics of a grasping act differ
depending on the final goal of the action (e.g., grasping tomove, to
throw or to pass, see Becchio et al., 2012). On the other hand, the
context provides clues for understanding the intention underlying
the observed motor act, and is known to modulate the activity
of the caudal sector of IFG, during action observation (Iacoboni
et al., 2005). This mean that, also in humans the mirror system is
involved in intention coding. In addition, it has been showed that
reaching toward an object and grasping it either to move it from
one spatial location to another or to place it into the hand of a
partner yield different kinematics (Becchio et al., 2010; for similar
results see also Mason and Mackenzie, 2005; Meulenbroek et al.,
2007). Interestingly, the observation of social movements evokes
an activation stronger than non-social ones within mirror areas,
including the IFG and the IPL (Becchio et al., 2012). These finding
demonstrates that areas within the mirror system are sensitive
to very subtle differences in the observed action’s kinematics.
Most importantly, it suggests that mirror areas in humans are
more responsive to social than non-social movements. Similarly,
Mu rhythm suppression has been shown to be greater for social
interactive actions than for non-social actions (Oberman et al.,
2007).
Altogether, these data suggest that during social interaction,
human agents decipher the goal of others’ ongoing action
and integrate it into their own action planning, eliciting
different potential complementary responses. Thus, the mirror
mechanism, being tuned to social actions, besides its known role
in motor cognition, is likely involved in social cognition.
Conclusion
This review was an attempt to outline an updated view of the
organization of the neural bases of grasping. Our knowledge
of the motor system hinges on a multidisciplinary approach
applied to the macaque monkey model. Obvious technical and
ethical limitations preclude the application of such method
to humans. However, clear homologies have been established
between the motor systems of the two species. The basic
mechanisms underpinning grasping actions are very likely shared
among primates and humans. Among these mechanisms is the
neuronal coding of movements in terms of motor goals and
the mirror mechanism, allowing to retrieve these goals during
action observation. The latter is an in-built motor resonance
mechanisms, deemed to be at the core of action understanding.
We believe that such neural coding, pertaining to the motor
system and originally evolved for guiding behavior, has later
become a fundamental component on which social cognition
was constructed. However, the possible role of other processes,
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for instance involvingmentalizing, should not be downplayed and
could work in parallel with the mirror system.
The mirror system is not only reflecting what another
individual is doing, but also integrates contextual aspects like
spatial cue, gaze direction or kinematic parameters. We discuss
how this process of internal simulation is at the bases of
action and intention understanding in monkeys and humans.
Human data also yield a further fundamental function of the
mirror mechanism: allowing the preparation of appropriate
complementary responses to the observed actions. This latter
process could explain how two individuals become attuned to
cooperate in a joint action. It also underlines the flexibility of the
mirror system.
Complex functions cannot depend on a single brain region but
are rather the results of several areas linked together by cortical
connections, and forming functionally specialized networks. The
grasping execution/observation system is no exception. Clearly,
specific sets of temporal, parietal and motor areas contribute to
different aspects of themirror system functions. This suggests that
the mirror neuron network extends probably beyond the motor
system to include other cortical sectors. A deeper investigation
of the role of these putative nodes of the mirror system, and
especially of those located in the prefrontal cortex, will be
crucial for defining the relationships between the classical mirror
circuit and other centers possibly exerting a top-down control
on them. This, in turn, will prompt a better understanding of
how information about the social context can influence our
comprehension of actions and intentions, and shape our own
motor programs.
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